We use a reputation-staking governance model. It works like this:
A member of a Menagerie community has a certain reputation score. She believes a certain smart contract template is optimal for XYZ outcome/application. She puts forth her idea to the group, and “stakes” part of her reputation on the idea that she’s right. If, in a vote, the members of her Menagerie community agree her proposal is acceptable, it is adopted, and becomes a valuable precedent. Other folks—inside and outside the group—will use her template until a better idea comes along. Her reputation increases. The group’s reputation increases, too.
In other words, growth for each person is correlated with group for each growth.
This means fewer pump-and-dumps and rug pulls. Incentives are aligned. Fewer agency problems. When one member of the pack succeeds, the whole pack succeeds at the same time.
In any given action or work, you are not creating wealth directly for yourself. You are creating reputation. Later, you are paid based on your reputation. Which creates a positive-sum game where everyone is invested in creating a positive reputation of productive cooperation, for themselves and for the group. This theory has been borne out as true through mathematical models and years of experience.
Our reputation-based model of organizing online community ecosystems is different from prior models, which mostly rewarded folks with fungible coins. Folks swiped as many of the coins for themselves as possible, without a thought for their long-term reputation, or the rep of the group.
Your reputation decreases:
● If your actions are deemed unhelpful or harmful.
● As time passes, your rep will diminish if you don’t participate in votes or don’t stake your reputation on votes. This helps keep the group lively, and encourages participation long-term.
Most prior attempts at community governance were static, dull, and unchanging. Menagerie’s reputation-based governance, by contrast, is dynamic and evolutionary. It has a decentralized on-chain precedent system. The system is continuously upgraded with real-time data.
Let’s return to the example of the woman who staked her reputation on the idea that a certain smart contract template was optimal for XYZ outcome/application. Her template is on the blockchain. If other users reference her template, it increases her reputation—and her salary.
If, on the other hand, other users don’t use her template, it dissipates over time. A new template emerges naturally. Its creator earns reputation—and salary.
This could be an eternal solution for community governance.
The Menagerie voting algorithm is a consensus making machine for communities.
In order to create a consensus for each community that is considering a proposal, Menagerie uses two types of votes for every proposal in every Menagerie community: “loosely coupled” and “tightly-coupled.”
1: Loosely-coupled votes
The first type of vote is called “loosely coupled.” It’s basically a test vote. These votes don’t count; their outcome is not binding. No reputation is at stake for anyone; no reputation can be gained or lost. These votes enable an open discussion about the future of the group, where dissenting voices are welcome, where people feel free to spitball, brainstorm, play devil’s advocate, and put forth ideas that might be very wrong—without staking their reputation.
After every loosely coupled vote, the community knows how every member who voted felt about the proposal. The community can not only see if members voted for or against the proposal, but the community can also see exactly how popular or unpopular the proposal was. This is possible through Reputation Staking. Now the community knows exactly how everyone felt about the proposal and can further debate the proposal before the next vote on the same proposal starts.
2: Tightly-coupled votes
In the second and final vote, called a “tightly-coupled” vote, someone’s reputation is “at stake.” Meaning: reputation points can be lost if the member is on the losing side of the vote. Reputation points can be gained if they are on the winning side. But, because everyone knows from the loosely-coupled vote how everyone else voted, it is easier to gauge where the majority stands, which makes it less likely for members to lose their reputation if they wish to avoid that.
In the overwhelming majority of proposals, the tightly coupled second vote will be unanimous.